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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

SELF, TIME, AND SUBJECT IN HEIDEGGER AND KANT

by



Michael S. Pozar

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled SELF, TIME, AND SUBJECT IN HEIDEGGER AND KANT, submitted by Michael S. Pozar, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

Kant explicitly sets out the distinction between his "empirical self" and "transcendental self" early in his epistemology. This thesis is concerned with the fact that an empirical/transcendental distinction also functions in Heidegger's conception of Dasein even though Heidegger never explicitly concedes this.

After briefly reviewing the way Kant sets up the distinction between the empirical self and the transcendental self in his epistemology, Heidegger's description of Dasein is considered, with particular attention being paid to the way that both empirical and transcendental elements are implicitly incorporated in that description. The one concept, "Dasein", includes both transcendental and empirical aspects whereas Kant carefully distinguished his "transcendental self" from his "empirical self".

Finally, Heidegger's accusation that Kant hypostatized the transcendental subject is considered. The argument is made that, by carefully developing the empirical/transcendental distinction the way he did, Kant protects himself from this charge. However, by failing to make the distinction as explicitly as Kant (by incorporating too much in the singular concept, "Dasein") Heidegger comes closer to hypostatizing the transcendental aspect of Dasein than Kant did to hypostatizing the transcendental subject.

At the very least this indicates that Heidegger's method of attempting to describe being by way of an "analytic of Dasein" was inadequate. By identifying the empirical human being with the transcendental (or "transcendent") Dasein Heidegger remains unable to go beyond Dasein to that which grounds Dasein (i.e., being per se). And, this may be what precipitated the famous "turning" Heidegger's thought took in the 1930's.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Kant's influence is evident throughout Heidegger's writings, beginning with his very first publications in 1912. Yet, when Heidegger has engaged in explicit interpretation of Kant he has rarely failed to engender controversy. On the one hand, there has been no shortage of defenders of Kant who have faulted Heidegger for his unorthodox interpretations and his apparent failure to understand some of the thrust of the Königsberger's thought.¹ Heidegger even seems to have conceded some of their criticisms since some of the more unusual facets of the interpretation he had in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (such as his claiming that the imagination is the "root" from whence springs both the understanding and the sensibility; or his dependence on differences between the first and second versions of the Critique of Pure Reason) were abandoned by the time of his lecture course in 1935-1936 on which he based Die Frage nach dem Ding. (In the latter work he bases his interpretation mainly on passages from the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason whereas in the former he based his interpretation on passages in the first

edition which he claimed were repudiated in the second.)

At the same time there are those who have gone to great length to clarify and explain Heidegger's position with regard to Kant without vigorously grappling with Kant's thought sufficiently to see if the criticisms are justified. Unfortunately, a large number of Heidegger's followers seem to fall into this category.² Their writings have helped us to understand what Heidegger is saying about Kant. But, they have not sufficiently inquired into whether or not he was justified in so saying.

A logical point at which to make just such an inquiry would be where the two thinkers deal with the self. Kant explicitly describes two distinct selves, as they are given in experience, one empirical and one transcendental. The empirical self (empirical subject) is an entity in the world of experience and the transcendental self (transcendental subject) is a merely formal element in the structure of experience. Throughout Kant's epistemology these two subjects remain distinct and theoretically separate.

When Heidegger talks about the "selfhood of the self" it is equated with Dasein's "transcendence" which is discovered through a transcendental analysis. However, this understanding of Dasein which is achieved through a transcendental analysis does not detract from the fact that Dasein is an (empirical) entity in the world among other entities. Thus, the description of the self in both

philosophers has as a basic element the transcendental/empirical distinction. Indeed, such a distinction may well be required of any philosophy that uses a transcendental method since the entities in experience will always, in some way, be distinguished from the unifying, structural elements in experience.

Heidegger's main criticism of Kant in this regard is that Kant reifies the self because he hypostatizes the (transcendental) subject. However, the argument will be made that Kant's willingness to distinguish his transcendental and empirical subjects, and to leave them distinct, at least in his epistemology, saves him from the charge of hypostatizing the transcendental subject. On the other hand, Heidegger implies the identity of the "empirical Dasein" and the "transcendental Dasein" (while nonetheless making the former at least logically dependent on the latter) by saying that Dasein is an entity in the world and then saying that the ontological meaning of Dasein's being is temporality--which temporality is the horizon of the world. This means that, since Heidegger discovered the horizon of temporality by way of a transcendental analysis of Dasein, he is himself open to the charge of reifying temporality ("transcendental Dasein") as a functioning of (empirical) Dasein, despite his apparent claim that Dasein's temporality is actually the phenomenon of primordial time per se, the time which is the temporality of being³ itself.

Because of the strong role that time plays in Heideg-

ger's description of Dasein, it is needful to observe along the way some of the differences in the manner in which the concept of "time" functions for each thinker. These differences exist despite the fact that time is discerned as "transcendental" by both men.

We will primarily be concerned with the Critique of Pure Reason and with Being and Time, although reference will occasionally be made to other sources. The problem with relying too heavily on Heidegger's commentaries on Kant is that it is sometimes difficult to separate what Heidegger is saying about Kant from what Heidegger is taking as his own position. When we get to the point of considering Heidegger's charges against Kant, then passages in which he makes those charges specifically will be considered.

Heidegger's claim is that, when he talks about the thought of certain great philosophers, he is engaging in a "thoughtful dialog" with them. Whereas such a dialog has its benefits, it does not free Heidegger from a certain responsibility to the texts as actually written by those philosophers. Despite the fact that Heidegger may be able to find some deep resonance with other thinkers through his thoughtful dialogs, he must nonetheless be held accountable when he attributes certain notions or certain inconsistencies to another thinker. If a concept or an inconsistency that Heidegger attributes to Kant is not

there, it simply is not there. The thoughtful dialog can continue; but it must not be made to depend on a misrepresentation. What Kant actually said is one thing; and what thoughtful insights can be derived from this is another.

At any rate, the fact that Heidegger came to abandon some of his earlier criticisms of Kant leaves open the possibility that he may need to abandon some other of his criticisms as well.

Most important of all, however, is what Heidegger's criticisms of Kant teach us about Heidegger's own thought. This is what is most at issue in the present essay.

II. KANT'S POSITION ON TIME AND THE SUBJECT

For Kant, space and time together account for the form of all intuitions which can arise by virtue of sensibility (an intuition being a certain manifold of sensory information which is given form by the formal elements of space and time). "Sensibility" is the term used to denote the human capacity to receive intuitions and is distinguished from the human capacity of "understanding". It is by virtue of the capacity for understanding that intuitions can be thought and, consequently, that concepts can arise. (A19, B33)⁴

The faculty (or capacity) of understanding can be divided into "inner sense" and "outer sense". Outer sense is the capacity to represent objects to ourselves and inner sense is the capacity to intuit our own inner states. (A22-23, B37) Outer sense is specifically called a "property of the mind" by Kant. (Ibid.)

The intuitions which arise in experience (by virtue of sensibility) can likewise be divided into "inner" and "outer". Our own inner states which we discover in our experience are termed "inner intuitions" and their form is

time. The objects which appear in our experience as outside ourselves are termed "outer intuitions" and their form is space. However, outer intuitions must also be formed by time. They must be "brought under" the form of inner intuition. Inner intuitions, on the other hand, are not "brought under" the form of space. (Our inner states are not thought of as being characterized by extendedness in space.) (Also, it can be noted that both in the case of the inner states and that of the outer objects we are considering them as they appear to us and not asking if they are any different "in themselves". How they are "in themselves" cannot be intuited; that is, it does not appear in experience.)

Space and time are properly said to be ideal. Since outer and (presumably) inner sense are "properties of the mind" and since space and time are nothing apart from the human experienter, the implication is that space and time are contributed to experience by the mind; that is to say, by the human experienter or "subject". Kant says, "Space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relation to one another. That is to say, space does not represent any determination that attaches to the objects themselves." And, again, "It can readily be understood how the form of all appearances can be given prior to all actual perceptions, and so exist in the mind a priori." And, "It is...solely from the

human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things." (A26, B42) And, again, "Time is...a purely subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible, that is so far as we are affected by objects), and in itself, apart from the subject, is nothing." (A35, B51)

Nevertheless, space and time are both empirical and transcendental. As empirical they are intuitions and appear as part of the world of experience. As transcendental they are subjective conditions of intuition. Therefore, even though space and time are subjective conditions of experience they are nonetheless also the conditions of any possible object which might appear in experience. This gives space and time objective validity.

We then assert that the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and that for this reason they have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgment. (A158, B197, emphasis omitted)

However, despite the fact that time is universal in experience, it is not time which is giving experience its unity. The unity of experience is something which is logically prior to the temporality of experience and therefore must be considered non-temporal or, perhaps, pre-temporal.

Because all unity, whether of experience or of formal time itself, derives from belonging to one synthetic consciousness, that unity, though necessarily bound up with time, is in itself a

nontemporal unity. The unity of consciousness is conceptual and not temporal in character.⁵

So, time is the "formal a priori condition of all appearances" (A34, B50) and, alternately, a "subjective condition of our (human) intuition". (A35, B51) Yet, Kant asserts that the "subject, as traditionally conceived" (i.e., as "substance" "in which thoughts inhere") cannot be found in experience. (A349) Heidegger will applaud Kant for not conceiving the subject as substance. Yet, Heidegger will assert that Kant has nonetheless hypostatized the subject. And, he will make this charge in reference to passages in which Kant is discussing his "transcendental subject". Eventually we will come to examine this charge. But, before we can do this we must begin by recalling the various ways in which Kant uses the concept of "subject".

A. The Empirical Subject

The empirical subject is the ever-changing being in the world of experience that we recognize as the self and is an object for consciousness just like any other object except for the fact that it appears in a special way--through "inner" sense.

Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearance. Such consciousness is usually named inner sense, or empirical apperception. What has necessarily to be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through

empirical data. To render such a transcendental presupposition valid, there must be a condition which precedes all experience, and which makes experience itself possible. (A107)

The individual thinks of himself as subject and, in so doing, he conceives of his true self as some sort of substance which perdures despite the many various changes that he observes in himself. (A349) This enduring aspect of the self is called soul. Yet, we cannot find any soul in our experience. All that is experienced is a continuous string of (inner) states. All of these inner states are thought of as belonging to one and the same, self-identical being. But, that is nowhere manifested in our experience. Indeed, it is a necessary element in our thinking. But, its necessity is not an empirical necessity. In the realm of the appearances of the inner states there is nothing at all which appears as the identity of these inner states, which leads to the conclusion that these inner states all belong to the same entity. Thus, the empirical subject is only what it is at any given moment.

B. The Transcendental Subject

Whereas the empirical subject is the way that the subject appears in intuition (and, actually, it does not appear save as a constantly changing set of "inner states" (B156) which are synthesized by the understanding into a unity), the "transcendental subject" is the subject as a

formal element in thought.

All concepts must be accompanied by the simple, and completely empty, representation, "I". (B404) "We cannot even say that this is a concept, but only that it is a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts." (A346, B404) "I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition." (B157)

This "I", then--this empty representation--is the transcendental subject. "Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x." (A346, B404)

This I or I-that-thinks or "I think" involves the synthetic unity in appearance in that the changing appearances are unified in terms of a self-identical I.

The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for their intuition, that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily interconnected. For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to a priori rules. (A108)

In this way, the synthetic unity of experience in terms of a self-identical "I" is a necessary condition for experience to be possible. (A107-110) This self-identical

I is the transcendental I or transcendental subject and in the passage above it seems clear that Kant wants to maintain that it is an element in the structure of our experience which is provided by the mind in thought.

C. The Subject In Itself (The Noumenal Subject)

The only way we find a self or subject in experience is as an empirical self which is constantly in flux, or as the transcendental self which is an element in the form of experience, an empty (contentless) thought. (B157) What I am in myself, apart from empirical representation or formal element in thought, is completely unknown. (B156)

What does it mean, then, to say, as has been done above, that time is contributed to experience by the subject? It cannot be contributed by the empirical subject because the empirical subject, like anything else that appears in the world of experience, is a representation. (B156) The empirical subject is appearance; but it is not the soul. It is not my own self. Rather, it is the way I appear to myself. It is myself insofar as I can be known to myself.

Thus, as appearance and representation the empirical self cannot be the source of time for experience. Nor does the empirical subject appear to be contributing time to experience. (Thus, the contributing of time is not

itself a representation which could then be assumed to be grounded in some thing-in-itself.)

Further, it cannot be the transcendental subject which contributes time to experience because the transcendental subject is itself merely an element in the form our experience takes. It really does not make sense to say that one element in the form of experience contributes some other element in the form of experience to experience.

However, since time (along with space) is the most universal aspect of the form that experience takes, Kant can insist that it is a condition for the possibility of any experience. It must be contributed to experience. Since it does not come through the senses, it is a reasonable assumption (in the absense of any counter-evidence) that it is given to experience by the mind. Thus, we must necessarily posit a mind or soul as the in-itself which accounts for the continuous and consistent contribution of the transcendental elements to experience. In effect, this is the natural outcome of the passage quoted above (A108). If we must think an entity which is the ground of unity among appearances, but cannot have an intuition of it, it is necessarily outside appearances. It is a noumenon. And time, then, (as transcendental) is the way that I am affected by my (noumenal) self.

In general, the noumenal realm serves in Kant as that

which assures a certain consistency in experience. In the "Refutation of Idealism", Kant tells us that we must posit noumenal objects to account for the consistency and constancy of the objects that we experience. Everything else that Kant describes, everything that is in experience is grounded in the subject in one way or another. The manifold of sense data is the way the subject is affected by the noumenal objects. It is received according to the (subjective) forms of space and time and then ordered according to the (subjective) categories. Only the noumenal objects (about which nothing is known) prevent Kant from having an outright, thoroughgoing, subjective idealism or even solipsism. Thus, the noumenal objects (which would include the noumenal subject) are that which "lies behind" experience and assures a certain amount of consistency and which prevents us from being able to capriciously create our experience in any fashion we please. In this way we get an entire noumenal world which lies as the "in-itself" behind the phenomenal realm that is given to experience. Then later, in his practical philosophy, Kant discusses the way that the noumenal self lies behind both the empirical self and the transcendental self. In the first Critique, however, Kant leaves open the possibility that they could arise from two separate sources.

III. METHOD

It would not be wrong to say that Kant is phenomenological in his method of examining experience-as-such and then describing the nature of appearance (any possible appearance) in experience. However, Kant is never so radical a phenomenologist as is Heidegger. Heidegger could never make the noumenal/phenomenal distinction because all he allows himself to examine is the phenomenal. Kant can posit noumenal objects which correspond to the phenomenal objects experienced. But Heidegger cannot even ask about the noumenal. If something does not appear it cannot be spoken about. It is true that we can be aware that there is more of being than just what shows itself at any given moment. But, this too must be revealed phenomenally as I shall explain presently.

Even being can only be discussed in terms of the temporal horizon of being. Heidegger does not (certainly not in Being and Time) pose the question of what being is like in itself. It is really an unthinkable question. This is why Heidegger approaches "the question of being" by way of "the question of the world". The appearance

of the world and the appearance of being are the same. This is why, as Richardson has shown, Heidegger's notion of "world" ends up merging into the concept of "being".⁶

The comprehension of Being as such is intrinsically finite. The function of Being and Time is to discern phenomenologically this finite comprehension of Being and reveal its ultimate sense. This finite comprehension is the transcendence of beings to Being, not an entity enclosed within itself but essentially an open-ness towards Being which is a process that comes-to-pass. Phenomenologically speaking, this process of transcendence is to-be-in-the-World, where -World is the horizon, projected by There-being /Dasein/, within which There-being "dwells" and encounters other beings, and to-be-in- means the point, or moment, when this World becomes luminous, insofar as There-being, in virtue of existence (comprehension), renders manifest the Being of beings. So intimate is this correlation between the World (Being) and the There-being, which is its illumination, that only insofar as There-being is "is there" Being.⁷

World, then, is not the earth. It is not terra firma. Nor is it any landscape or view that one might experience. World is rather the "totality of involvements" of the entities we find "in the world". In this sense world is the region in which entities can appear.

It is true that one can say of both "world" and "being" that they exceed our ability to know or comprehend them. But, this also is revealed phenomenally. That is, it is part of the appearance, the givenness, of everything (and not just world or being) that there is more to what appears than just what we can know or describe or understand. This, we could say, is the appearance of mystery. Mystery is not simply an absence or privation in our experience. If it

were just an absence we would not be aware of it at all. Rather, the things that appear to us must appear in such a way as to let us know that there is more to them than just what we can comprehend in our understanding.

Heidegger attempts to deal with this sort of notion in such essays as "The Origin of the Work of Art". Every work of art, we are told, has its "earthly" quality which appears as the material out of which it is made. And, it also participates in a "world" of meaningfulness and interrelations. The earthliness conceals while the worldishness reveals. The stone out of which the Greek temple was formed is essential to show the "otherness" of the temple. The temple is not me and always somehow exceeds my ability to comprehend it in thought (or even to comprehend it in the sense of putting my arms around it). But, the world of the Greek temple opens up possibilities of meaningfulness and relatedness which allow me to "comprehend" it in some sense. Concealing and revealing both take place in the encounter with the temple. Yet, even as the earthliness of the temple somehow conceals something about the temple from me it simultaneously reveals the fact that something is being concealed. Thus, whereas mystery is a concealing of something it is even more fundamentally a making aware of the fact that there is more to the world and the things of the world than one can comprehend. This is why Heidegger says that truth,

which is basically "un-concealedness",

occurs as such in the opposition of clearing and double concealing. Truth is the primal conflict in which, always in some particular way, the Open is won within which everything stands and from which everything withholds itself that shows itself and withdraws itself as a being.⁸

Even in Heidegger's later writings, when he is no longer talking about the temporal horizon of being, he is still talking about "being" in terms of what is revealed, what is discoverable phenomenologically. Regardless of whether Heidegger is talking about being as event (Ereignis), or as the regioning, or as ontological difference, he will never seek to go somehow beyond the human realm to a realm of the gods or a realm of pure forms. It is the fact that we are aware, for instance, of the ontological difference between being per se and individual beings that interests Heidegger.⁹

At the same time, the notion that Heidegger begins as a transcendental philosopher in the Kantian mold and only later becomes dominated by a philosophy of being is to be rejected. From first to last Heidegger is a philosopher of being. To be sure, the present essay depends on the fact that Heidegger employed a transcendental method in his early writings. But, that method was employed with the hope that it would yield access to being. It is even possible to interpret Heidegger's abandoning of the transcendental analytic (transcendental analysis) of Dasein as a sign that he concluded that such a transcendental

analytic was insufficient in giving access to a description of being. Richardson expresses this point in very strong terms when he says that "Kant's influence was as extrinsic in the beginning" of Heidegger's career "as it clearly is now at its term".¹⁰ That is not to say that the things which Heidegger gleaned from Kant were not important, even crucial. But, in the final analysis Heidegger was not to be limited to the frame of reference that Kant circumscribed.

Thus, we begin by reminding ourselves that Heidegger is radically phenomenological and that his eventual abandoning of the "transcendental analytic of Dasein" does not change this. With this in mind we can proceed to consider the way in which Heidegger viewed Kant. But first we must consider what Heidegger had to say about time, Dasein, and the subject.

IV. DASEIN AS EMPIRICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL

A. Empirical Dasein

According to Heidegger, subject, soul, consciousness, spirit, and person are all entities that can be located in the world of phenomena. "All these terms refer to definite phenomenal domains which can be 'given form': but they are never used without a notable failure to see the need for inquiring about the being of the entities thus designated." (BT 72)¹¹

Heidegger does not tire of saying that "subject", in particular, means subjectum in the sense of hypokeimenon or reified thing.

Ontologically, every idea of a 'subject'--unless refined by a previous ontological determination of its basic character--still posits the subjectum (hypokeimenon) along with it, no matter how vigorous one's ontical protestations against the 'soul substance' or the 'reification of consciousness'. (BT 72, emphasis omitted)

And, Heidegger later makes it clear that he does not think that Kant provided the "previous ontological determination of its basic character". Thus, in Heidegger's opinion, for Kant to say "subject" is for him to refer to a particular thing in the world. "To define the 'I' ontologically

as "subject" means to regard it as something always present-at-hand [on-hand, vorhanden]. The Being of the 'I' is understood as the Reality of the res cogitans." (BT 367)

When reference is made to the Aristotelian hypo-keimenon in the characterization of the idea of Being which underlies the modern conception of man, this is done in order to clarify the meaning of Being-on-hand [Vorhandensein] as "Being reified" and not generally as "presence". What was decisive for Heidegger was that these determinations conceived of the essence of man as the subject "in the sense of the Being-on-hand of other created things".¹³

Heidegger is saying that when Kant finds the human being to be essentially "subject", this amounts to reducing the self to a reified thing; and, wittingly or not, Kant has subsumed every other understanding of the human being under this understanding of the human being: that thing in the world, in the midst of other things, which is the knower of those other things. (Whether the self for Kant is a "real" or "ideal" thing, this does not matter. The point is the same.)

Thus, Heidegger has made it clear that he is using the term "subject" very differently from the way in which I have described Kant as using it. For Heidegger, "subject" refers to an entity within the world of experience and, indeed, must be something like the "empirical subject" as that was found in Kant's writings. But, Heidegger does not want to make the mistake that he thought Kant made (i.e., of ultimately viewing the human being as merely one more entity among others in the world), so he must

devise a way of talking about the human being that will not have this implication. Consequently, he chooses the term "Dasein" to include the notion of the (empirical) entity and more. Dasein is not just an (empirical) "world-less" subject (BT 144-145) that is "welding together" the totality of things given in the world, including itself. That is, Dasein does not begin with a group of objects which are given as objects and then combine them somehow to make up a total, unified world of which it is aware. Dasein is not simply an empirical entity that can somehow "glue" together all given objects, thus producing an organized whole. Nor is Dasein merely "welding" itself onto a somehow pre-given world-totality of objects. (BT 236) Dasein does not start with a pre-given, organized whole which it must simply fit itself into. Dasein is a being in the world among other beings. But, Dasein not only finds itself to be a mere entity; Dasein is also a part of a world, a world which Dasein allows to appear. What this means is revealed through a "transcendental analytic of Dasein".

B. Transcendental Dasein

"Dasein" is the name Heidegger gives to the human being, "man himself". (BT 32) It is unique among beings in that its own being is an issue for it. (BT 32, 67) Dasein is a being in the world, an empirical being (a

"subject", if you will¹⁴). In this way we could speak about "empirical Dasein". But, Dasein is also more. It is a major theme in Being and Time that Dasein's essential being is "concern" (Sorge) (BT 225)¹⁵ and that the "ontological meaning of concern" is "temporality". (BT 370ff.) What does this mean?

Heidegger speaks of a "totality of involvements" which makes up the context of the world of experience.¹⁶ Anything that appears in the world appears in this totality of involvements and thereby receives its "worldly character".

As the Being of something ready-to-hand /handy, zuhanden/, an involvement is itself discovered only on the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements. So in any involvement that has been discovered..., what we have called the "worldly character" of the ready-to-hand has been discovered beforehand. (BT 118)

This totality of involvements defines the potential interrelationships of the entities within the world including Dasein as empirical entity. The totality of relationships in the world are "bound up" in the "primordial totality" (BT 120) which is the very being and meaning of worldhood. (BT 120-122) That is, this totality of involvements is the "structure" that is constitutive of the world of experience. (Cf. BT 119)

In allowing entities to appear in experience Dasein provides for the "region" in which they can appear. This is done by allowing or "freeing up" the "totality of

involvements" which define the world.

To free a totality of involvements is, equiprimordially, to let something be involved at a region, and to do so by de-severing and giving directionality; this amounts to freeing the spatial belonging-somewhere of the ready-to-hand. In that significance with which Dasein (as concerned Being-in) is familiar, lies the essential disclosedness of space. (BT 145)

Heidegger always avoids explicitly saying that Dasein "provides" or "creates" the meaning structure which is a "totality of involvements". However, it is indicated in this passage that Dasein somehow bears responsibility at least for the occasioning of the appearance of said totality. Dasein frees up a totality of involvements and thereby lets something "be involved at a region". The appearance of the totality as totality depends on Dasein's freeing it up to appear. "Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed." (BT 269) And, this happens because Dasein opens up, enlightens, a region in which entities can be.

In providing for the totality of possible involvements, Dasein "gives space" to the entities in the world, thereby "making room" for them. (BT 146) To say this is not to say that there is anything willful involved on Dasein's part in so doing. It is merely to say that Dasein has always "already discovered a 'world' at any time" (BT 145), a world which is not only discovered but also occasioned and brought to light (brought to appearance) by Dasein.

At the same time, Heidegger says,

Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space. Space is rather 'in' the world in so far as space has been disclosed by that Being-in-the-world which is constitutive for Dasein. Space is not to be found in the subject, nor does the subject observe the world 'as if' that world were in a space; but the 'subject' (Dasein), if well understood ontologically, is spatial. And because Dasein is spatial in the way we have described, space shows itself as a priori. This term does not mean anything like previously belonging to a subject which is proximally still worldless and which emits a space out of itself. Here "apriority" means the previousness with which space has been encountered (as a region) whenever the ready-to-hand [handy, zuhanden] is encountered environmentally. (BT 146, *emph. altered*)

Heidegger says here that space is not contributed to the world of experience by the subject. Of course we must keep in mind that Heidegger's use of the term "subject" carries a rather specific and rather narrow definition, as has already been explained. Hence, for him to say that space is not contributed by the subject is the same as when he says that the subject is not "welding together" the totality of somehow pregiven objects. This is the negative side of what is being said.

On the positive side, what Heidegger affirms is that space is (constantly) disclosed by Dasein's way of being in the world. Even with the full weight of all that Heidegger understands Dasein to be, he does not quite say that Dasein contributes space to the world of experience. Rather, he says that Dasein discloses space. And, further Dasein is spatial in that it is of such a nature as to

always be doing this disclosing.

Thus, on the one hand we have Dasein "giving space" to the entities in the world while, on the other hand, we are told that Dasein "discloses" space per se. It is indeed conceivable that it is merely by Dasein's disclosing of space that Dasein gives space to (and, hence, makes room for) the entities in the world. In order to say more on this issue we must consider the question of Dasein's temporality since "temporality" is the meaning of Dasein's being, which way of being is required for the giving of space to the entities in the world.

To understand what Heidegger means by declaring the meaning of Dasein's being to be temporality we must refer back to what I have already said about Heidegger's phenomenological methodology. Heidegger attempts to consistently describe only phenomena. Something's being, therefore, is the way that it is given to appear. It is the way it "shows itself". (BT 51)

Dasein's being, for example, includes an understanding of being per se. (BT 228) It also includes "being-alongside" (entities encountered within-the-world). (BT 237) Also involved is Dasein's "being-ahead-of-itself" (which I shall explain below). All of these are aspects of Dasein's way of being in the world. They are aspects of the way that Dasein gives itself and shows itself to be. The totality of these elements or aspects of

Dasein's way of being is indicated by the single term "concern" (Sorge). To say that Dasein's whole way of being can be summed up in the term "concern" is to use the term differently from the way that it is ordinarily understood. It is to load the term with as much as it can possibly hold.

But, the important thing at this point is to point out that all of the things that the term "concern" is being loaded with are things that were discovered phenomenologically. The elements which we say are basic to Dasein's way of being in the world must show themselves as such. For example, investigation must somehow reveal that being-alongside entities in the world is a fundamental element in the way that Dasein is.

Then, when the meaning of concern is said to be "temporality" we are given to understand that all the elements which make up "concern" are not only ways of Dasein's being but they are temporal ways of Dasein's being. Indeed, it is only because all the elements of "concern" (as Heidegger defines it) are in some sense temporal that Heidegger can say that the meaning of concern is temporality. Everything which we can say about Dasein's being, about "concern", is a temporal something.

But, we must make an even stronger statement here. At one point Heidegger says that Dasein's being (summed up in the concept of "concern") is "ahead-of-itself-being-

already-in(the-world) as being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)". Here Heidegger is not simply talking about one element or aspect of Dasein's way of being. This delimits the "structural whole" of Dasein's being. (BT 236) Thus, we are not merely adding up all of the aspects of Dasein's way of being that we can think of and seeing that they are all temporal and concluding that the meaning of Dasein's being is temporality. Rather, we must come to understand that temporality is the meaning of the "structural whole" from which all of the various elements of Dasein's being (which we can potentially isolate) are derived.

Let us explicate this a bit further. Dasein always begins by "opening its eyes" and finding itself already in a world. The world is given as world and it is always a world recognizable as world and always filled with entities, one of which entities is Dasein itself. This is the "being-already-in-(the-world)".

At the same time Dasein is aware that the particular way in which Dasein is situated in the world and the particular way that it relates to the world are not the only possible ways it can be situated and relate. Dasein is also always confronted with a variety of other possibilities. Dasein is aware of its particular empirical self, as it is in the world. But, Dasein is also aware of its potential self. Or, rather, Dasein is also aware

of a great variety of other possibilities it has. And, even at the times when Dasein is not particularly conscious of these other possibilities, we can nonetheless affirm that other possibilities are always available to be chosen.

In each case Dasein has already compared itself, in its Being, with a possibility of itself.... Being towards one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being means that in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself in its being.... This structure of Being...we shall denote as Dasein's "Being-ahead-of-itself". (BT 236)

Thus, "ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-(the-world)" speaks of Dasein's "facticity", Dasein's finding itself in a certain given situation which has a recognizable character as being a finite and meaningfully-structured world, a situation into which Dasein is "thrown". Yet, Dasein is not "stuck" with everything remaining exactly as it is or with everything just working itself out mechanically. The above phrase also speaks of Dasein's "freedom", Dasein's "being-free for authentic existentiell possibilities" (BT 237, *emph. omitted*).

And, be all this as it may, Dasein still finds itself as one entity among others in the world. This is the "being-alongside".

From this transcendental analysis, Heidegger goes on to propose a schematism of sorts. The three elements of the above exposition of Dasein which I have just described, "ahead-of-itself", "being-already-in" and

"being-alongside", are dis-covered to be the three "ex-stases" of time: future, past, and present.

In that Dasein is always facing its own possibilities as its own potential self, Dasein is said to be futural.

Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself. Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural, and in such a way that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, as being, is always coming towards itself--that is to say, in so far as it is futural in its Being in general. (BT 373)

Looking to possibilities is looking toward the future.

But, Dasein does not just look at possibilities in order to ponder or admire them. Dasein views possibilities with an eye to realizing some of these possibilities, with an eye to incorporate some of these possibilities into its own facticity.

As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as "having been". Anticipation of one's uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to one's ownmost "been". (BT 373)

The situation of the world in which Dasein finds itself "thrown", Dasein's "facticity" in the world, is the past. It is the "having already come to being". And, the point at which the future potentiality becomes the past facticity is the present.

Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the situation by making present. The character of "having been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which "has been" (or better, which "is in the process of having been") releases from itself the present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of

having been; we designate it as "temporality".
(BT 374, emphasis omitted)

Dasein is temporality in that Dasein is a process of turning future potentialities into the facticity of the past. The "cutting edge" of this process, the point at which the future becomes the past is the present. And, the present is the present as the presence of the world of objects which presents itself before us. Temporality is the meaning of Dasein's being in that temporality is the meaning of the way that Dasein has its being. And, part of the way that Dasein has its being is by allowing (enabling) the world of entities to present itself.

Thus, the transcendental nature of temporality (and, mutatis mutandis, the transcendental nature of Dasein) is manifest. Temporality is not an entity (BT 377) because it is the very possibility of these being entities, of entities giving themselves to appear. Primordial time is finite (BT 379) because its appearing is, in essence, identified with (is the meaning of the being of) Dasein which is itself finite. Dasein, insofar as it is temporal/transcendental, opens up the possibility of there being a world. It "makes room" for entities to appear.

Certain comparisons between Kant and Heidegger are already emerging. But, before we can draw our final comparisons with Kant, at least one more issue needs to be explored.

C. Dasein's "Transcendence"

Having established the way that Heidegger's concept of "world" merges into his concept of "being", and the way that "temporality" is virtually identified with "Dasein" (at least with "transcendental Dasein"), it still remains for us to explore the relationship of "world" and "Dasein" (or, if you will, of "being" and "time"). This, of course, is no mean task. Indeed, it is (one form of) the question that dominated Heidegger's entire career. But, it will be useful to observe some of the ways that Heidegger dealt with this issue.

Ordinarily we think of "transcendence" as referring to going beyond the world that we ordinarily experience. However, this is not the case with Heidegger. Rather, we are told that Dasein transcends towards the world, but does not transcend the world. What Dasein does transcend is the various particular entities within the world. In Kockelmans' works:

As transcendent, Dasein surpasses neither a 'boundary' in which as a subject it would have to remain (immanence), nor a 'gap' which separates it from the objects. Furthermore, that toward which the surpassing takes place is not an object, objectified being. What is surpassed is rather every being which can become unconcealed to Dasein, as well as the being which Dasein 'itself' is.¹⁷

Thus, Dasein transcends every particular by being oriented toward the world which it "gives itself". So, when Heidegger says that Dasein "transcends" he is not

talking about Dasein going beyond the world of experience. In fact, as Sherover and others have pointed out, when Heidegger uses the term "transcendent" he often means virtually what Kant means by the term "transcendental".¹⁸

In What is Metaphysics? Heidegger deals with the same sort of issue by speaking about the "abyss" rather than the "world". Dasein is "held out into the abyss"; but it does not transcend the abyss. Like the world, the abyss is the region in which entities can appear. The abyss is the appearance of nothingness in that it is the (empirically) empty background which is needed for any thing, any being, to appear. Dasein "goes beyond beings" by being "held out into nothingness".¹⁹ Thus the similarity of nothingness to "the world" is obvious. Heidegger even makes the explicit statement that Hegel is correct in saying that "pure being and pure nothingness are... the same".³⁰ I have already pointed out that the concept of "being" and the concept of "world" become merged in Being and Time. Similarly, the concept of "being" becomes merged with the concept of "nothingness" or "the abyss" in What is Metaphysics?. We could say that being and nothingness are the same because being, as the "totality of possible involvements", is empty and void of content and therefore appears to us as nothingness as surely as it appears as world. It is nothing because it is no thing but rather the realm of the possibility of any thing.

This also helps us explain why Heidegger can say that "Being itself is essentially finite".²¹ Being and nothingness are both encountered as (both show themselves as) the potentially limitless region which is nonetheless at any given moment a finite realm for a finite Dasein.

A third way of approaching this issue is found in the way that Heidegger speaks about "language" in some of his later writings. Language is said to be the "house of being", the house in which Dasein "dwells".

In thinking Being comes to language. Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home.²²

In its essence language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing....Language is the lighting-concealing advent of Being itself.²³

On one level it would appear that Heidegger has simply substituted the metaphor/concept that he was using for another which says much the same thing. Language as the house of being replaces time as the horizon of being. A crucial difference, however, (perhaps the crucial difference) is the fact that "language" is not discovered or described based on an analytic of Dasein as was "temporality". "Language" does not serve as a spatial concept as did the "temporal horizon" or the "abyss of nothingness". Yet, it still provides a certain sort of "space" in which being can be. Thus, as Ricoeur has argued, it seems that it is basically the same issue

which is at stake here as was at issue in the earlier writings.²⁴

What we have, then, are different attempts to deal with the question of the relationship of Dasein and being. The question is never fully answered. There always remains a certain amount of vagueness.

In the case of "temporality", at least, it would seem to be quite clear that "temporality" is rooted transcendently in Dasein. This is especially true in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics where the imagination, by its synthesizing function, is said to institute the dimensions of present, past, and future and thereby to institute time.²⁵ Heidegger even goes so far as to say that the transcendental imagination is primordial time. And, as has already been shown, in Being and Time "temporality" is said to be the very meaning of Dasein's being.

At the same time, we cannot ignore the occasional passages in which Heidegger seems to be talking about time as something beyond or more primordial than Dasein, in apparent contradiction to the passages which I have just cited. For example, in at least one place Heidegger says that the transcendental imagination is rooted in time.

It is only the fact that it is rooted in time that enables the transcendental imagination as such to be the root of transcendence. Original time makes the transcendental imagination possible.²⁶

The ambiguity is increased in the later writings on language. If language is being's house, in which Dasein

dwells, this means that both being and Dasein are housed in, are "dwelling" in, language. This would seem, at first, to leave us with the uncomfortable position that there is something, namely language, which is more primordial than being itself. Actually, the point is that Dasein and being are equally primordial in the appropriating event (Ereignis) of language. Thus, "language" is taking on almost "meta-physical" proportions as the event of the appearing of the original interconnection and interrelatedness of Sein and Dasein. Even though Heidegger abandons the transcendental analytic of Dasein, he does not lessen his emphasis of this theme.

How, then, does Dasein "transcend"...to the world, to the abyss, to being? What is the relationship of Dasein and being?

It is not clear that Heidegger ever tells us any more than that Dasein does transcend, i.e., that there is indeed a relationship of Dasein and being, and that it is a very intimate relationship and yet that neither Dasein nor being can be reduced to the other. Both are given to appear in the realm of phenomena. Es gibt Sein; es gibt Zeit. Each needs the other. Obviously Dasein needs being because without being nothing at all can be. (Whatever that statement means, it is unquestionably true.) But, being also needs Dasein because no being (and not even being itself) can come to appear unless

there is Dasein "lighting it up", "making room for it".

Only when there is Dasein is there being.

Does not Being and Time say on p. 212...., "Only so long as Dasein is, is there /gibt es/ Being"? To be sure. It means that only so long as the lighting of Being comes to pass does Being convey itself to man. But the fact that the Da, the lighting as the truth of Being itself, comes to pass is the dispensation of Being itself.²⁷

Since temporality is the horizon of the world, since Dasein is so intimately associated with "world" and "being", Heidegger can say:

To say that in existing, Dasein is its "there", is equivalent to saying that the world is 'there'; its /Dasein's/ Being-there is Being-in. And the latter is likewise 'there', as that for the sake of which Dasein is. (BT 182)

In providing for the appearance of the meaningful structure of the world, Dasein accounts for the there (the Da), the region in which (empirical) entities can appear (including Dasein itself insofar as it is empirical).

At times Heidegger seems to describe this intimate relation of world and Dasein as though the two could almost be identified. We are told, for instance, that the world has Dasein's kind of being and that Dasein is its world.

That inside which existing Dasein understands itself, is 'there' along with its factual existence. That inside which one primarily understands oneself has Dasein's kind of being. Dasein is its world existingly. (BT 416, emph. omitted)

On the one hand Heidegger seems to be maintaining Dasein and being as clearly distinct. On the other hand,

Dasein "makes room (Raum)" for a world of entities and that world has Dasein's kind of being. The world presented to us is a temporal world. The world is circumscribed by time. Time is the horizon of the world and of being.

This points up the problem that Heidegger encountered with his use of a transcendental method. The world has Dasein's kind of being. Being itself is historical; it is temporal. Thus, the temporality of being is revealed through Dasein's temporality. This is the motivating thought behind Being and Time. However, Heidegger was never quite able to reach this conclusion, either in the published volume of Being and Time or even, it appears, in the unpublished second volume.²⁸ He appears to have discovered that a transcendental analysis of Dasein leaves one with important insights into Dasein but can never go beyond that directly to an understanding of what grounds Dasein. Heidegger's attempt in Being and Time to avoid subjectivity ultimately failed because Dasein as the "horizon of being" can finally only show forth its own temporality and not the temporality of being itself.

Thus, when Heidegger says that Dasein is its world "existingly", the "existingly" is meant to modify the degree of identification of Dasein and world. The relationship of the two is so "intimate" that they can be

said to be at one and yet not quite be one. The one is not...without the other. And, the fact that world has Dasein's kind of being indicates, it seems, that both are temporal. But, the exact relation of the two must to some degree always be a mystery.

Heidegger says:

Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the "ecstases" of temporality. Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first emerges from itself; its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases. What is characteristic of the 'time' which is accessible to the ordinary understanding, consists, among other things, precisely in the fact that it is a pure sequence of "nows", without beginning and without end, in which the ecstatic character of primordial temporality has been levelled off. But this very levelling off, in accordance with its existential meaning, is grounded in the possibility of a definite kind of temporalizing, in conformity with which temporality temporalizes as inauthentic the kind of 'time' we have just mentioned. If, therefore, we demonstrate that the 'time' which is accessible to Dasein's common sense is not primordial, but arises rather from authentic temporality, then, in accordance with the principle, "a potiori fit denominatio" we are justified in designating as "primordial time" the temporality which we have now laid bare.
(BT 377)

If Heidegger is claiming to have "laid bare" the structure of temporality as the primordial "outside-of-itself in and for itself" by showing it as a transcendental of Dasein (or, in fact, the very being of transcendental Dasein), and if this transcendental structure provides the background or horizon which makes possible the "ordinary understanding" of time, then

Heidegger's claim is indeed justified.

If, however, Heidegger is claiming to have laid bare a "primordial time" which transcends and thereby grounds Dasein, and if this is the primordial time which only appears as the phenomenon of Dasein's temporality, then Heidegger's claim is not justified at all.

It is not precisely clear from the text which claim Heidegger is making; although one suspects that he is making the former claim (as he does elsewhere) while at least wishing to make the latter (which he also does elsewhere).

The primordial "outside-of-itself" is the transcendence of Dasein. Dasein is always already in a world. It is always already caught up in the totality of involvements which makes up the world. It is always already in a relationship with the plethora of entities which surround it in the world and in a relationship with world per se. Thus, "outside-of-itself" is the way that Dasein is as it allows to come to appearance that totality of involvements which is the world.

Heidegger says that the "ontological constitution of the world" is grounded in temporality. (BT 416) But then he clarifies this by saying that "the existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon." (Ibid., emph.

omitted) Thus, the horizon provided by temporality is the condition for the possibility of the world's appearing. Temporality does not need to be ontologically any more primordial than the world or Dasein in order to "ground" the world in this way.

Ultimately we are left with an ambiguity. The meaning of Dasein's being is temporality. The nature of primordial time is uncovered through a transcendental analysis of Dasein. Hence, time and temporality, as they are given to appear, must be grounded in Dasein. Yet, on the other hand, Heidegger leaves us with certain indications that Dasein must depend on some "primordial time" to provide it with its own temporality. Hence, Dasein must be grounded in temporality.

The simplest solution to this ambiguity would be to assert the identity of Dasein and temporality. For the most part, we would be justified in doing so on the basis, at least, of Heidegger's early writings. However, we must concede the fact that there are also certain places where Heidegger seems to place temporality as something which somehow goes beyond Dasein. Sometimes time seems to be identified with being itself. This, in fact, is the interpretation which Gadamer asserts in Truth and Method.²⁹ True, being is temporal/historical. But, if it is correct that Heidegger's intention was to identify "being" and "time", the least that can be said is that

he failed to establish this in Being and Time or anywhere else where he depended on a transcendental analysis of Dasein.

In the later writings, we find many indications in favor of this latter interpretation. For example, when Heidegger is talking about language he makes such strong statements as, "Language is the lighting-concealing advent of Being itself."³⁰ We cannot automatically assume that he would necessarily say the same thing about temporality. Yet, the parallel use of "language" in the later writings to the use of "temporality" in the earlier writings has already been pointed out, and is very instructive at this point.

Nonetheless, the transcendental "grounding" of temporality in Dasein is what can be expressed with the most justification in the earlier writings. It is what can be best illuminated by the use of a transcendental method. And, it is what Heidegger has established (wittingly or not) with the greatest degree of justification. Therefore, it is of the most interest in any comparison with Kant.

However, after Heidegger abandons his use of a transcendental analysis of Dasein around 1930, the fact that Dasein is grounded in something even more primordial seems to be emphasized much more strongly.

In Being and Time the possibility of transcendence is explicated with regard to the temporal structure of human existence. Accordingly, the nature of the 'horizon' of transcendence seems to be

rooted in the nature of man. But in order to strengthen his interpretation of human existence as Da-sein, Heidegger comes to emphasize more strongly that the nature of man is rooted in the 'there'. He therefore ceases to explain the 'there' in terms of a horizon of transcendence and begins to speak of it as a 'clearing' which does not originate in the specifically human act of transcendence. He rather speaks of the 'event' (Ereignis) of the clearing as one in which the possibility of human existence first arises. The clearing is not brought about through the activity of disclosure (or consciousness), nor is it to be explained as originating in things (or objects).³¹

But, even then, the intimate interrelation and interdependence of Dasein and being is the overarching theme which informs all of the other themes.

Dasein's "transcendence", then, is rooted in this fundamental interdependence of Dasein and being. The fact that this basic relationship exists accounts for the possibility of any "subject" relating to any possible "object". Dasein's part in the relationship is to "light up" the world of being, to occasion the opening, the clearing, the Spielraum where beings can appear and being can occur. Transcendental Dasein, then, as temporality, presupposes this kind of transcending on Dasein's part. Or, put otherwise, it would probably be possible to say that the transcendental temporality of Dasein is an expression (a phenomenon?) of Dasein's "transcendence".

D. Summary

Thus, in describing Dasein Heidegger relies on the

same empirical/transcendental distinction which Kant employed in describing his "subject". Dasein, as a being in the world, appears as an empirical entity, the being "which-I am". But, in "transcending", Dasein is able to provide for the (transcendental) "horizon" of the world. The transcendental/empirical distinction functions no less strongly in Heidegger's thought (at least the earlier thought) than it does in Kant's writings, despite the fact that Heidegger never made it very explicit.

To recapitulate, the relationship between time and the subject for Kant is as follows. Time is the form of inner intuition and, when combined with space, provides the transcendental form in which the full scope of experience appears. The transcendental subject is also a transcendental element in experience, but as a "mere" (contentless) appearance which accompanies every representation in thought.

In addition to there being the transcendental subject there is also the empirical subject. The empirical subject is that entity in my experience which I experience as the being (among other beings) which I myself am. Time is related to the empirical subject as the form of "inner" sense. That is, it is the form taken by that flow of "inner" sense. That is, it is the form taken by that flow of "inner" perception, the continuous string of "inner" states, which we experience as our own.

To account for the constancy of the transcendental elements in experience as well as the "in-itself" of the empirical subject we must necessarily posit a noumenal subject. Nothing is known of this subject-in-itself. But, the positing of its existence is a reasonable assumption which can explain certain aspects of experience.

For Heidegger, time is the "horizon" of the world of experience. Dasein, by virtue of its temporality, provides for this horizon. This providing is a "condition for the possibility" of there being a world at all. Dasein, in its temporality, frees up a totality of involvements which makes up the world. This "totality of involvements" which Dasein "frees up" may not be a framework (Gestell) (Heidegger calls the totality of involvements "meaningful" rather than "formal."), but it is nonetheless an enabling of the world to appear by providing the "open space", the Spielraum, where entities can be. This is the transcendental function of Dasein; or, we could say, it is "transcendental Dasein".

Dasein (by virtue of its empirical and transcendental "aspects") is always already "outside-of-itself". Its very being accounts for the fact that it is related to a world of objects. The fact that this relationship is structured as an "outside-of-itself" tells us that transcendental Dasein's horizon includes the scope of all that appears as "inner" as well as all that appears

as "outer", to use Kant's terms.

Kant told us that "outer intuition" must be brought under "inner intuition", the latter of which is formed by time. Thus, for both Kant and Heidegger, time is the most universal element in the particular form or being that the world of experience takes. Whereas Heidegger would probably resist referring to time as the form of the world of experience, he certainly lets us know in other ways that it is the most universal aspect of the world and, indeed, that which gives the world of experience its basic "shape".

At the same time Dasein is a particular entity in the world; not just any entity, but rather that entity which we ourselves are.

So Heidegger's transcendental Dasein and empirical Dasein parallel Kant's transcendental and empirical subject. Dasein is temporality. Whereas Dasein, as a being in the world, is constantly changing, its identity is contained in the temporality which it itself is and which provides for the region in which it can appear alongside all other possible entities in the world. In that the (empirical) being in the world that we recognize as the self is constantly changing, with no abiding identity except the "structuring" ("horizon-providing") character of temporality, this is the same as it is in Kant. Similarly, since Dasein's transcendence is the "selfhood of the self",

and since its temporal nature is discovered transcendently, we have a "transcendental self" in the writings of both thinkers. However, the "transcendental self" found in Heidegger (temporality) is much more like "time" in Kant than it is like Kant's "transcendental subject" in that it defines the horizon of the world of givenness and does not appear as a subject per se.

The closest Heidegger comes to having something in his own writings which is like Kant's transcendental subject is when he says that Dasein has a certain "mine-ness" about it. However, this is stated almost as an aside and is never developed.

Saying that temporality is the phenomenon of being would seem to imply that being is the "noumenon" of temporality. This leads us to ask about the role of the noumenal in Kant and possible parallels in Heidegger.

In the refutation of idealism Kant tells us that we must posit noumenal objects to account for the constancy and consistency of the objects that we experience. Similarly, we must posit a noumenal self, something like a soul, which accounts for the constancy and consistency of the transcendental elements in experience.

Since Heidegger remains radically within the limits of a phenomenological method, he cannot speak about noumena which lie behind the phenomena. The Dasein that appears is Dasein as Dasein appears. This indicates the

impossibility of inquiring into any noumenon of Dasein or of temporality.

Nevertheless, it seems that, if Dasein's temporality is meant to be the appearance of the primordial temporality of being itself (even if Heidegger fails to fully establish this), then "being" is serving as a certain sort of noumenon of primordial temporality in the earlier writings. Even in the later writings, when language is described as the "house of being" it would seem that being is even there almost a noumenon of "language" which "houses" it.

Furthermore, we have found that for Kant the unity of experience is logically prior to the temporality of experience. In this way, even time is grounded in something else, something which is itself non-temporal. This is quite different from Heidegger.

Heidegger never goes "behind" temporality. Dasein's temporality is meant to reveal the basic temporality of being itself. Thus, nothing is in any sense prior to the temporality of experience, unless it be the temporality of being per se.³²

We now turn our attention to Heidegger's criticism of Kant and use what has been said up to this point as the background against which we can evaluate the criticism.

V. HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF KANT

The main text that I shall consider from Being and Time in which Heidegger criticizes Kant's way of conceiving the subject is found on pp. 366-370. It is in this passage that Heidegger attempts to distinguish his own position from Kant's and in which he attempts to describe Kant's position as he understands it.

Heidegger begins by citing certain key passages from the first Critique which indicate Kant's stated position regarding the "I" or "transcendental subject":

The 'I' is a bare consciousness, accompanying all concepts. In the 'I', 'nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts'. 'Consciousness in itself (is) not so much a representation...as it is a form of representation in general.' (B404) The 'I think' is 'the form of apperception, which clings to every experience and precedes it'. (A354) (BT 366)

The first thing that must be stressed here is that the quotations that Heidegger has selected are talking about Kant's "transcendental subject". Neither the empirical nor the noumenal subject are in any way referred to at this point.

Heidegger's commentary on these quotations must be observed closely. It is a bit confused. But, in sorting

it out one discovers something about Heidegger's misunderstanding of Kant which in turn is instructive of why Heidegger makes the particular criticisms he does.

Kant grasps the phenomenal content of the 'I' correctly in the expression 'I think'....In Kant's sense we must take saying "I" as saying "I think". Kant tries to establish the phenomenal content of the "I" as res cogitans. If in doing so he calls this "I" a 'logical subject', that does not mean that the "I" in general is a concept obtained merely by way of logic. The "I" is rather the subject of logical behaviour, of binding together. 'I think' means 'I bind together'. All binding together is an 'I bind together'. In any taking-together or relating, the "I" always underlies--the hypokeimenon. The subjectum is therefore 'consciousness in itself', not a representation but rather the 'form' of representation. That is to say, the "I think" is not something represented, but the formal structure of representing as such, and this formal structure alone makes it possible for anything to have been represented. When we speak of the "form" of representation, we have in view neither a framework nor a universal concept, but that which, as eidos, makes every representing and everything represented be what it is. (BT 367)

To begin with, it is a little suspicious that Heidegger says that the phenomenal content of the "I" is grasped by the expression 'I think'. He would seem to be stacking the deck from the outset. One would expect the phenomenal content of anything to be on the level of the empirical. But we are talking here about the transcendental subject which, by definition, has no empirical content. It does appear in the phenomenal realm, but only as a formal element in the constitution of that realm. And, while it is true to say that the transcendental subject is that formal element in terms of which all of my experience

is unified as mine, this is quite different from saying that the "I", the transcendental subject, has its content established as a res cogitans, a thinking thing.

The empirical subject is a res, perhaps even a res cogitans. It is a thing in the world which I experience as the flux and flow of my "inner" states. Thus it would appear that Heidegger may be conflating the transcendental subject and the empirical subject at this point. If this is what has happened, the effect of this conflation could be, in fact, to hypostatize the transcendental subject, to make it into a thing-in-the-world.

Even if Heidegger means that Kant's transcendental subject is a res cogitans only in an ideal sense, this is still a completely unacceptable understanding of Kant. As the contentless, transcendental "I" which accompanies every concept as a necessary formal element, the transcendental subject cannot even be said to be an ideal res cogitans.

In the fourth sentence of the above quotation in which Heidegger begins talking about a "logical subject", we return to a proper discussion of the transcendental subject. It is the transcendental subject which is the logical subject as the merely formal "I" which accompanies every representation and in terms of which all experience is unified. When we discover that the "I" is a transcendental element of all experience we discover something

about the "logic" of experience. It is indeed a manifestation of something about the intrinsic logic of experience which shows the fact that all experience is my experience. (In Heideggerian language, all being-there has a certain "mineness" about it.) All experience carries with it the potential awareness that I am having the experience. Every experience of a green persimmon, for example, carries with it the potential awareness that I am thinking about a green persimmon.

Thus, there may be a certain sense in which it is correct to say that the transcendental subject "underlies" experience. It underlies experience in that it provides an element in the inner logic of experience which is necessarily present in order to give experience its particularly human shape. Thus, it would not be wrong to say that in this way the transcendental subject provides the horizon of the world of experience.

But Heidegger is saying that the transcendental subject underlies experience as a hypoikeimenon. He apparently is not using the term here merely in the sense of "substance", the way the term is sometimes translated. Rather, as has already been explained, it seems to carry more the sense of a reified entity.³³ Hence, Heidegger is telling us here again that Kant has hypostatized the subject, be it transcendental or not.

At the end of this quotation Heidegger makes use

of another Greek term. He speaks of the "I think" as the eidos which "makes every representing and everything represented be what it is". In what sense could the transcendental subject be an eidos? We might be able to speak about the noumenal subject being the eidos of both the transcendental subject and the empirical subject in the sense of the "essence" which accounts for their unity. In this case "eidos" would refer precisely to the "in-itself" or noumenon. However, Kant's "I think" refers to something transcendental in experience. It is the condition for the possibility of any experience whatsoever. It is the function which must obtain in order for human experience to be. What the source of this function is is not the crucial issue. It could, conceivably, come from any source, just as long as it did indeed obtain.

It is conceivable that Heidegger could have meant for us to understand eidos here in the sense of the form of the (phenomenal) world which is both "transcendental" and "ideal". That would entail a rather oblique allusion to Plato. But, such an interpretation seems rather unlikely. The more likely case is that Heidegger is telling us in yet another way that Kant has reified or hypostatized his "subject". The passage which follows immediately in the text would reinforce this interpretation:

Kant's analysis has two positive aspects. For one thing, he sees the impossibility of ontically reducing the "I" to a substance; for another thing,

he holds fast to the "I" as 'I think'. Nevertheless, he takes this "I" as subject again, and he does so in a sense which is ontologically inappropriate. For the ontological concept of the subject characterizes not the Selfhood of the "I" qua Self, but the selfsameness and steadiness of something that is always present-at-hand [on-hand, vorhanden]. (BT 367)

Here Heidegger is clearly charging Kant with hypostatizing the subject when he says that Kant's subject is something "on-hand" (vorhanden). This term is usually (perhaps always) used by Heidegger to indicate the simple, "brute" presence of a thing in the world as distinguished from the purposefulness or usefulness that that thing can have, which is indicated by the term "Zuhandenheit". (Gadamer has gone so far as to suggest the term "innert presence" as a possible translation of Vorhandenheit precisely to emphasize this distinction.)

It is really rather strange that Heidegger does not make the empirical/transcendental distinction here in discussing Kant. Kant does not even define the subject per se. He defines the subject as it appears as a thing in the world among other things which is constantly changing (empirical subject) and he defines the subject as it appears as a structural element in experience which indicates that all experience is my experience (transcendental subject). And, indeed, experience does appear to have only one subject. But, Kant can only posit a noumenal subject to account for the apparent singularity and unity of the subject. Ontologically the subject is only posited

but not defined by Kant, and that not until the context of his practical philosophy.³⁴

It remains for us to ask whether or not Kant has hypostatized his transcendental subject.

The transcendental subject is a condition for the possibility of there being any human experience. That is, all our experience must be unified in terms of a self. But, this need not be an empirical self. It only need be a "logical self". It only need be a contentless element in the structure of experience. Strictly speaking, it need have no connection to the empirical self whatsoever. At this level, then, the transcendental subject has not been hypostatized. It is merely a condition which must be met in the structure of experience in order for there to be experience. It is a function which must be performed regardless of the separate issue of what the source of the functioning is.

At the same time Kant does become involved to a certain extent in a faculty psychology. He tells us that the sensibility is the faculty of receptivity, that the imagination is responsible for synthesis, and that the understanding is responsible for the categories. By describing the human faculties which produce the various elements needed in the structure of human experience, Kant has grounded the structure of experience in the human experienter. Thus, the transcendental subject, like every

other element in the structure of experience, is ideal in nature. Yet, this does not detract from the fact that even if the transcendental subject did not originate in the faculties of the mind it would still have to come from somewhere in order for there to be any human experience.

Thus, the transcendental subject (like any other transcendental element in experience) is distinguishable from the particular source that is credited with supplying it. In this way the transcendental subject has not been hypostatized by Kant.

The case is quite different, of course, with the empirical subject. Quite clearly it is a thing in the world along with other things in the world; and, in this sense, it is hypostatized. But, as has already been pointed out, Kant does not identify the transcendental subject with the empirical subject. He does not even assert, in the first Critique, that they are from the same source or possess the same noumenon.

Heidegger, on the other hand, begins by identifying Dasein-as-a-being-in-the-world (the being that each of us is) with Dasein-the-meaning-of-whose-being-is-temporality. "Transcendental Dasein" is the way that "empirical Dasein" has its being in the world. In this way it seems that Heidegger is much more guilty than Kant of reifying and hypostatizing his "Dasein". And, because he discovers time transcendently, Heidegger is moving in the direction

of reifying time since he is never able to reveal time as anything more than the meaning of Dasein's being (despite the fact that time is also the horizon of being). So long as he discovers time by way of a transcendental analysis of Dasein he is unable to demonstrate that time is anything at all beyond Dasein's way of being in the world.

By making the criticisms that he makes, Heidegger is clearly attempting to distinguish his own position from Kant's. He charges Kant with ending up with a "subject" that is reified into a selfsameness and steadiness of something "on-hand". In contradistinction to this, Heidegger wanted to establish a "Dasein" that was "transcendent". He wanted to be able to go "through" Dasein to get to being itself by virtue of the "transcendent" quality of Dasein. He took it as a transcendental of Dasein that Dasein had a certain access to being per se. Therefore, by exposing this transcendental (which he called Dasein's "transcendence"), Heidegger meant to expose being as well.

To put this another way, if Dasein, being, and their relationship all have a phenomenal aspect (are all manifest as phenomena), then the task is simply to expose the respective phenomena as what they are. However, the transcendental method contains within itself certain characteristics which make it rather ineffective in accomplishing this task.

The most that the transcendental analytic of Dasein could allow Heidegger to firmly establish was that time or

temporality is rooted in Dasein; or, perhaps that Dasein is (in some sense) temporality or time. The transcendental method can expose or analyse Dasein; but it cannot then go past Dasein to ask what "grounds" Dasein. That may be a useful question. But, it is ruled out by the method itself. This is a constraint that both Kant and Heidegger had to contend with.

Whereas it may be completely legitimate for Heidegger to assert that Dasein's temporality is an instance or appearance or indication of the temporality of being per se, the use of the transcendental method to demonstrate this is futile. It is bound to fail.

It seems implausible that Heidegger would want to charge Kant with reifying the "subject" in order to justify his own reification of "Dasein". As has already been pointed out, Heidegger was first and foremost a philosopher of being; and his use of the transcendental method was secondary. He was completely willing to abandon the transcendental analytic of Dasein when that proved ineffective in achieving his goals. When the transcendental analysis he employed in Being and Time failed in enabling Heidegger to describe the intimate relationship of Dasein and being, when that method left him with too much of a subjective grounding for time, Heidegger could throw it off and attempt to talk about Dasein and being in other (although still phenomenological) ways. And, it was only a short

time after the publication of Being and Time that this happened.

VI. CONCLUSION

Thus, both Kant and Heidegger require the empirical/transcendental distinction to describe their respective notions of the self, as it appears in the realm of givenness, the "world" of experience. Both tell us of a particular (empirical) entity who is there in the world but whose "whence and whither" "remain in darkness". (BT 173) Its only identity is the one it has at the particular moment.

At the same time there is a transcendental subject for Kant which is the contentless, structural element in experience in terms of which all experience is unified. All experience is my experience. It always carries with it the potential awareness of this "mineness" of experience. But, this awareness is "empty" in that it has no empirical content. It is merely a part of the formal structure of experience.

For Heidegger, the meaning of Dasein's being is "temporality". Since this is discovered by a transcendental analysis of Dasein, I have referred to it as "transcendental Dasein". This temporality is the "horizon" (the occasion and place of the appearing) of the "totality of

involvements" which is the world, which is primordial temporality, and which is being itself. Thus, Dasein's temporality is, in a sense, the "phenomenon" (the appearing) of being.

The transcendental Dasein in Heidegger is by no means identical to the transcendental subject in Kant. There is really no way that Kant could call his transcendental subject a "horizon" for experience. Kant's notions of "space" and "time" come much closer to forming the horizon of experience in Kant's thought. Since they make up the basic formal element of all intuition, they can be said to open up the region in which all experience must take place and in which all things must come to appearance if they are to appear at all.

The crucial thing about the transcendental subject in Kant is that it is what makes it possible for me to know that all my experience is in fact mine. Kant goes to great length to develop the idea that the transcendental subject is a necessary formal element in experience. And, it is in terms of this formal element that all of experience is unified into one continuous, coherent flow of experience. Heidegger does no more than to concede that Dasein has a certain "mineness" about it. He does not raise the question of what the source or the significance of that fact may be. He simply asserts it and then goes on to other matters.

"Time", then, also functions differently for the two thinkers. Briefly, time is a formal and subjective element in experience for Kant. It is contributed by the mind. Hence, it is the way that I affect myself in my own human perceptions. The fact that the world is experienced as a temporal world depends on my contributing time or temporality to the world. Hence, the unity of experience is logically prior to the temporality of experience. It is conceptual rather than temporal. Thus, time is grounded in something which is non-temporal.

For Heidegger, on the other hand, Dasein's temporality is Dasein's openness to being. Dasein's temporality points to the temporality of being itself. Heidegger gives us strong indications that Dasein's temporality is grounded not in Dasein but rather in the primordial temporality of being. However, since temporality is discovered by way of a transcendental analysis of Dasein, this would seem to leave Heidegger no way past the more modest (and more Kantian) claim that temporality is grounded in Dasein itself rather than being itself. As has already been explained, "transcendental Dasein" (temporality) seems to be like "time" in Kant in that they both provide a certain "structure" (a "totality of involvements") to the world as it is experienced. Whatever lies "behind" temporality as its "noumenon" should therefore be unknowable in any transcendental philosophy. And, further,

transcendental analysis of Dasein should only be able to tell us about Dasein and unable to tell us about being itself. This, in effect, leaves Heidegger unable in the final analysis to go beyond a subjective grounding of time.³⁵ And it is quite likely that this is why we get the change from a transcendental analytic of Dasein to a more speculative approach after the "turn" which Heidegger's thought took in the 1930's.³⁶ It would seem that the transcendental analysis of the earlier writings could only allow Heidegger to explore the intimate relatedness of Dasein and temporality. He then had to turn to other ways of exploring the intimate relatedness of Dasein and being.

Ironically, what we learn by discovering the weaknesses of Heidegger's criticism of Kant is the consistency in Heidegger's own thought. Even though Heidegger decided that he had to abandon the transcendental analytic of Dasein, he nonetheless maintained some of the main themes and concerns of the earlier writings. Gradually Heidegger moves from considering the way that Dasein opens up the possibility of the coming to appearance of being to a description of the original e-vent of appearing in which being and beings are equiprimordially given to appear. In the later writings Dasein is not even described so much as the occasion of the appearance of being as it is described as the shepherd of being, the one into whose "hands" is placed the responsibility of the awareness of being.

Thus, the ideas were already present in Being and Time which would necessitate Heidegger's abandoning the transcendental analytic of Dasein in order to more fully achieve his desired ends. His first loyalty was as a philosopher of being rather than as a Kantian transcendental philosopher.

Nonetheless, Heidegger remains a phenomenologist in an important sense. In abandoning the transcendental analytic of Dasein he was not going back to a metaphysical description of what does not appear. He always continued to attempt to describe being as it was given to appear--as we are able in one way or another to be aware of it.

NOTES

1. A prime example would be: Ernst Cassirer, "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics", Kant: Disputed Questions, ed. Moltke Gram (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967).

2. This would include: William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Throught Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963). See also: J. L. Mehta, Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1976).

3. Unlike English, all nouns are capitalized in German. Because of this, there is some variation between translators as to which ones are to be capitalized in English. For the sake of consistency I have chosen not to capitalize the English translations of any of Heidegger's terms. It seems to me that this practice puts me closer to the original German since in the original Heidegger's special terms are not distinguished in form from any other nouns.

4. I will consistently use this conventional method of indicating the page numbers in the first and second German editions of the Critique of Pure Reason.

5. Ronald P. Norrison, "Kant, Husserl and Heidegger on Time and the Unity of 'Consciousness'", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec., 1978, p. 184.

6. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 200, 58-59, 103-105.

7. Ibid., pp. 103-104.

8. Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art", Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 60-61. (Cf. BT 56-57, 256-268)

9. William J. Richardson, "Kant and the Late Heidegger", Phenomenology In America, ed. James M. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 140.

10. Ibid., p. 143.

11. I identify passages from Being and Time by the page numbers in the English translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

12. Cf. BR 366-368.

13. Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 87, emphasis omitted. I generally follow Kisiel and Greene in their choices of English equivalents for Heidegger's key terms.

14. Cf. BT 87, 149-151, 248, 367.

15. Macquarrie and Robinson translate Sorge as "care". However, I follow Kisiel and Greene who translate it as "concern".

16. I use the term "world of experience" to refer both to Heidegger's "world" of givenness and to Kant's "experience". In both cases what is meant is the whole of givenness as organized in a consistent and coherent fashion. Surely Heidegger would not have liked the term "experience" because of its subjectivistic implications. However, this does not eliminate the basic similarity of the two concepts. Any differences in the concepts are inconsequential for the present endeavor. Hence, using the same term in referring to both authors makes the task of comparison a bit easier.

17. Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Heidegger on the Self and on Kant's Conception of the Ego" in Heidegger's Existential Analytic, ed. Frederick Elliston (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978), p. 144.

18. Cf. Charles M. Sherover, Heidegger, Kant and Time (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), p. 16.

19. Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?", trans. David Farrell Krell in Basic Writings, ed. D. F. Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 111.

20. Ibid., p. 110.

21. Ibid., p. 110.

22. Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", trans. Frank A. Cepuzzi, in Basic Writings, ed. D. F. Krell, op. cit., p. 193.

23. Cf. Ibid., p. 206.

24. Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 223-235.

25. Trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 180.

26. Quoted in William J. Richardson, "Kant and the Late Heidegger", op. cit., p. 128.

27. Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", op. cit., p. 216.

28. Part of the second volume was published very late under the title, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. Cf. Michael E. Zimmerman, "Heidegger's 'Completion' of Sein und Zeit", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, pp. 537-560.

29. "...in the unfolding of ideas in Being and Time it seemed at first simply an intensification of transcendental reflection, the reaching of a higher stage of reflection, when the horizon of being was shown to be time. It was, after all, the ontological groundlessness of transcendental subjectivity, of which Heidegger accused Husserl's phenomenology, that seemed to be overcome through the revival of the question of being. What being is was to be determined from within the horizon of time. Thus the structure of temporality appeared as the ontological determining factor of subjectivity. But it was more than that. Heidegger's thesis was that being itself is time." Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 227-228.

30. Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", op. cit. p. 206.

31. Norrison, op. cit., p. 196.

32. It is difficult, if not impossible, to be more exact as to the relationship of being and Dasein, partially because Heidegger is intentionally vague at times and partially because the position does seem to shift somewhat (certainly the terminology shifts) from one work to the next.

If we were to make use of theological terms, we might suggest that Heidegger appears to be closer to panentheism than he is to pantheism. Whereas all things participate in being and being appears in or through or with all things, nevertheless being is more than the sum of all beings. It is both more and less. Each individual

thing or being maintains some integrity of its own even though it must participate in being in order to be. At the same time, being (as the manifold of involvements) can be distinguished from any particular being. Being and beings are distinct but not separable.

Likewise, Dasein and being are distinct but not separable. Viewed phenomenologically, neither being nor beings appear except when Dasein provides the occasion (which Dasein does just by virtue of being Dasein). Yet, is Dasein not still in some sense dependent on being? The panentheist position would be that being (God) is the most fundamental source and ground of both Dasein and beings. Thus, being would provide Dasein with the task of providing the "clearing", the Spielraum, in which both being as such and the plethora of beings can appear.

In this way there can be a certain sense in which time or temporality is grounded in Dasein and yet Dasein is grounded in the primordial temporality of being as such. It would be Dasein's temporality which would provide for the horizon of the world; and yet Dasein nevertheless receives itself, including its temporality, from being. In this way the primordial temporality of being (the primordial temporality which is being?) would be said to ground Dasein.

In understanding Heidegger through the use of theological categories we must be careful to distinguish being (God) as the source and ground of all beings from any notion of God as ens increatum, ens infinitum, or ens perfectissimum. In panentheism God is not seen as the highest being but rather as the source and ground of all beings which nonetheless exceeds even the totality of all beings. (In Tillich, for example, God is "the depth" in all things.) When Heidegger claims that being is not God he is talking about God as ens infinitum or ens perfectissimum.

33. See pp. 19-20, above. Also, see Werner Marx, op. cit., p. 87.

34. If Heidegger is defining Dasein "ontologically" as temporality or time, then we can say that Kant in a certain sense did the same thing. But, this would involve a sense of the term "ontological" which we would not expect, one which makes the given meaning-structure of experience ontological. And, if this is the case, then Heidegger cannot object to Kant's ontological definition without objecting to his own as well.

35. This has been noted by many commentators. Cf. J. L. Mehta, Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision

(Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1976), p. 46. Also, Ernst Cassirer, "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics", Kant: Disputed Questions, ed. Moltke Gram (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 153.

36. "In the end, is even the position which Heidegger tries to establish in opposition to Hegel trapped within the sphere of the inner infinity of reflection?" Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 102. At another point in the same essay, Gadamer also says, "There is more at stake here than the question which many have put to the later Heidegger, specifically how his convincing critique of idealism at the level of consciousness, which, when it appeared in Being and Time, ushered in a new era in philosophy, could be upheld in opposition to Hegel's philosophy of mind (Geist). That it could appears all the more uncertain since Heidegger himself, after the "turning", abandoned his transcendental conception of self, on the one hand, and Dasein's understanding of being as the point of departure for posing the question about being, on the other. Does he not draw close to Hegel in this? For it is Hegel who explicitly carried the dialectic mind or spirit beyond the forms of subjective spirit, beyond consciousness and self-consciousness. Furthermore, in the view of all those who seek to defend themselves against the claims of Heidegger's thought, there is one point in particular where Heidegger seems to converge again and again with Hegel's speculative idealism. That is in his inclusion of history in the framework of philosophy's questioning." (pp. 103-104) Thus, we have the suggestion that Heidegger was never able to fully free himself from a certain amount of idealism. If the transcendental method was meant to protect him from grounding his thought too much in subjectivity, it failed. But, in abandoning it, Heidegger may have actually been moving closer to Hegel rather than further away.

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